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Litigation and the Optimal Combination of Vague and





In this paper we determine the optimal combination of precise and vague clauses written in
contracts when the parties face writing and enforcement costs, the second ones in the form of
litigation. We show that the parties may prefer to write vague instead of precise clauses not only
because they are cheaper to write but also because they are cheaper to enforce. We extend Battigalli
and Maggi (2002) to model the decision of a principal who chooses clauses to describe the actions
that an agent has to perform. As both players observe nature imperfectly they may call for a court
to determine whether the agent performed the right action. We show that the principal tends to
sue the agent more frequently when a task is described with a precise instead of a vague clause.
The reason is the following: with precise clauses, the frequency of litigation increases with the value
of the task that is described because a smaller discrepancy in the beliefs of the players is enough
to trigger a dispute, but with vague clauses, that frequency decreases with the value of the task
because the probability that the agent performs the right action increases with the value of the
task. The direct implication is that vague and not precise clauses (as it is predicted by Battigalli
and Maggi) are used to describe the most important tasks of a contract.
Keywords: Optimal Combination of Clauses, Vague and Precise Clauses, Writing and En-
forcement Costs, Litigation.
JEL classication: D86, K12, K41
a-bustos@law.northwestern.edu
yThis paper is a revised version of the second chapter of my PhD dissertation. I am grateful to Patrick Bolton
and Bentley MacLeod for useful comments.
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1 Introduction
Legal scholars argue that the contracting parties should avoid writing clauses that are prohibitively
expensive to enforce. However this prediction does not describe reality accurately as we often nd
commercial agreements including expressions like the parties should act in good faith,managers
should make decisions in the best interest of shareholders or the agents are expected to make
reasonable decisions.Why are the parties interested in including ambiguous terms in their contracts
and when should they use them more intensively?
While precise clauses1 are terms that clearly specify the actions that the promisor should per-
form, vague clauses2 are terms that only demand best e¤orts from the promisor in the performed
action. The literature suggests that the optimal combination of these clauses in contracts is deter-
mined by a trade-o¤ between their writing and enforcement costs. Comparatively, precise clauses
are more expensive to write because they provide detailed explanations of the actions for every
possible scenario but would be cheaper to enforce because they are easier to interpret.3
We notice however that the papers that have studied contracts that face writing and enforcement
costs (Dye (1985), Anderlini and Felli (1994 and 1999), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Bernheim
and Whinston (1998), Krasa and Villamil (2000)) model the enforcement process in a much too
simple way.4 These models fail to notice that the enforcement process is the resolution of a conict
between the promisor and the promisee in which a third party, usually a court, is called to make a
decision. In that case focusing attention only in the cost of enforcement may be misleading because
the process (litigation) may actually never take place. That could be the case if the promisor freely
fullls the demanded action or the court always decide in favor of one party. Among the few papers
that take into account the role of litigation in the design of contracts, Triantis (2002) and Scott
and Triantis (2006) develop a descriptive theory that identies the combination of clauses that
1Also called complete or bright line rules.
2Also called incomplete rules or standards.
3Some times the literature presents the trade o¤ between rules and standards in the following way: while rules
mandate actions that are optimal at the moment of writing the contract, standards mandate actions that are optimal
at the moment of enforcing the contract. Kraakman and Hansmann (2004) nicely describe this distinction in the
context of corporate governance.
By contrast, few jurisdictions rely on the rules (precise clauses) strategy as a principal device for regulating
complex, intra-corporate relations, such as for example, self dealing transactions initiated by controlling shareholders.
Such matters are presumably, too complex to regulate with a matrix of prohibitions and exemptions, which threaten
to codify loopholes and create pointless rigidities. Rather than rule-based regulation, then intra-corporate topics such
as insider self-dealing tend to be governed by open standards (vague clauses) that leave discretion for adjudicators
to determine ex post whether violations have occurred.
For an extensive analysis see Kaplow (1992).
4They distinguish between veriable and non-veriable actions such that the rst ones are relatively cheaper to
enforce and the second ones can be substituted by second best veriable actions. Consequently, optimal contracts
should describe only a subset of the veriable actions in order to save writing costs and replace the non-veriable
actions in order to save enforcing costs.
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optimally balances the distribution of evidentiary proxies (between the front- and back-end stage
of a contract) that would be used, in the case of a legal dispute, to determine whether a contract
was breached or not.5
In this paper we show that it is not always the case that the optimal selection of precise and
vague clauses is determined by a trade-o¤ between writing and enforcement costs. We show that
the contracting parties may be interested in writing vague instead of contingent clauses because
they are cheaper to write and, at the same time, cheaper to enforce (obviously that is not always
the case otherwise the contract will only have vague clauses.) We model enforcement as a litigation
process that the parties can generate in order to decide whether the contract was fullled or not.
We show that in that case, precise clauses are more expensive to enforce because they tend to
generate litigation more frequently than vague clauses.
Precise clauses are statements full of details that explain the conditions under which the promisor
should perform a certain action, while vague clauses are simple statements that only demand best
e¤orts in the performed action. Then, the more important (valuable for the promisee) is the action,
the more likely is that a precise clause will generate a litigation because a smaller discrepancy
between the parties about the interpretation of the clause will be enough to generate a dispute.
Nevertheless the more valuable is the action the less likely is that a vague clause will generate a
litigation because the promisor will make a higher e¤ort in order to avoid the risk of having to
compensate the promisee in a big amount of money.
We build on Battigalli and Maggi (2002) where a principal chooses among contingent (each
state of nature induces a unique action), rigid (a set of states of nature induces a unique action)
and discretionary clauses (a set of states of nature induces a set of actions) in order to describe the
actions that an agent has to perform. The main prediction of the paper is that contingent clauses are
used to describe the most important tasks, rigid clauses to describe tasks of intermediate importance
and discretionary clauses for the least important ones.
As a matter of convention, contingent clauses correspond to what we and the literature calls
precise clauses, hence we will use these terms interchangeably.
In our model we suppose that the parties can not only write contingent, rigid and discretionary
clauses but also vague clauses. In addition, we assume that the parties observe the state of nature
imperfectly. Then, while under precise clauses the agent is called to perform the action specied
in the contract for the true state of nature, under vague clauses the agent is called to perform
the action specied in the contract for what she believes is the true state of nature. Due to the
imperfect observability the parties will have di¤erent beliefs whether the agent fullled the contract
or not. If these di¤erences are strong enough the parties will call for a court in order to resolve the
dispute. We assume that the objective of the court is to enforce the contract and the remedy is
5The parties can choose to specify at the writing stage (front-end stage) how to determine whether the contract
was fullled or they can leave this task to the court in the eventuality of a dispute (back-end stage).
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expectation damages.
The features of the equilibria when the parties face contingent and vague clauses are the follow-
ing. Under a contingent clause, the agent always execute the correct action for her belief about the
state of nature but the principal may sue her due to his belief that she observed the wrong state of
nature. The higher the value of the task the higher the probability that the principal sues because
the smaller is the conict of beliefs required to trigger a trial. Under a vague clause, the agent may
or may not execute the correct action for her belief about the state of nature and the principal
may sue because of this. The court does not pay attention to the true state of nature but to the
belief of the agent. The higher the value of the task the lower the probability that the principal
sues because the higher is the probability that the agent executes the right action.
A rst implication of the paper is that contracts use contingent clauses less frequently when the
parties face writing and enforcement costs than when they only face writing costs. The reason is
that neither discretionary nor rigid clauses generate trials as the agent never breaches the contract
under them. A second implication is that contracts become even less intensive in contingent clauses
when vague clauses are available because vague clauses are cheaper to write and cheaper to enforce
if the value of the task is big enough. Directly from that and unlike in Battigalli and Maggi we
conclude that the most important tasks of the optimal contract are described with vague and not
contingent clauses.6
Unlike Scott and Triantis, our results are not sensitive to the relative ability of the players
(principal, agent and court) to observe the correct state of nature. Contingent clauses generate
more litigation than vague clauses only because they generate more conicts leading the parties to
trial. The relative abilities of the players to enforce the optimal contract do a¤ect the frequency of
litigation but that is true for vague and contingent clauses in the same way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model: the basics
of Battigalli and Maggi and the enforcement process. In Section 3 we determine the optimal
combination of clauses when the parties face writing and enforcement costs but they cannot write
vague clauses. In Section 4 we determine the optimal combination of precise and vague clauses. In
Section 5 we conclude.
2 The Model
We start by describing the basics7 of Battigalli and Maggi (2002) and recalling the optimal contract
when the parties only face writing costs. Later, we introduce the possibility that the parties face
6We nd that the marginal benet of a task is smaller when it is described with a vague clause than when it is
described with a contingent clause, nevertheless this di¤erence tends to disappear with the value of the task such
that at certain point the di¤erence in the frequency of trials makes the rst type of clauses more desirable.
7For further details you may want to read the paper directly.
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enforcement costs in the form of a trial. We assume that the agents observe the state of nature
imperfectly such that, depending on the value of the task that is described and the degree of the
conict of beliefs between the parties, they may decide to resolve their dispute (whether the agent
performed the action demanded by the contract) in a court. In the next Section we determine
the optimal combination of clauses in the presence of enforcement costs and compare it with the
optimal combination of clauses when there are no enforcement costs.
2.1 Basics of Battigalli-Maggi
A principal o¤ers an agent a contract. The contract is dened by g = ^Kk=1(k  ! k) and a transfer
t 2 R where k 2 e is a well-formed formula (later dened as a combination of sentences) about the
environment and k 2 a is a well-formed formula about the behavior. e is the set of all logical
combinations of the primitive sentences describing an elementary event e = fe1; e2; e3; :::g and
a is the set of all logical combinations of the primitive sentences describing an elementary action
a = fa1; a2; a3; :::g. For example, in the case that the shareholders of a corporation (principal)
want to specify the actions of the manager/CEO (agent) when she faces a takeover o¤er the event
ek can be o¤er is for more than 20% of the outstanding sharesor o¤ered price per share is above
200% of its market valueand the action ak can be accept the takeoveror call for a shareholders
meeting. As logical connectors BM identify : (not), ^ (and), _ (or),  ! (if...then) the
parentheses and the logical constant T (tautology). Then, contract g is an obligation for the
principal to transfer an amount t to the agent and a set of clauses in which the agent is supposed
to perform ak if ek takes place. Notice that the transfer is paid regardless the action is performed
or not.
From this characterization BM are able to identify a complete contract as a set of clauses in which
each state induces the agent to perform a particular action. They call these clauses: contingent. On
the other side, an incomplete contract may contain clauses of two types. Clauses that incompletely
characterize the event space, which they call rigid (for example, independent of the characteristics
of the o¤er always accept it) and clauses that incompletely characterize the action space, which
they call discretionary (for example, if the o¤er is for more than 20% of the outstanding shares then
the manager must make a decision).
The cost of writing contract g is C(g) = cng in which c is a constant cost and ng is the number
of primitive sentences (regardless they are ek or ak). Implicit in this denition, there are no writing
costs associated to the logical connectives.
After the principal o¤ers the contract, the state of nature is realized and the agent chooses her
behavior. By assumption only the principal pays the writing costs and renegotiation is ruled out.






n [s(en)b(an) + (1  s(en))(1  b(an))]
In this expression, n 2 [min; max] and positive is the principals incremental benet from match-
ing en with an or :en with :an. By its side s(en) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
state of nature en takes place and 0 otherwise and b(an) is a dummy variable that takes value 1
if the agent executes action an and 0 otherwise. As BM explains it, that is a very simple payo¤
structure in which the principal obtains (maximum) benet 1 if and only if the agent performs the
optimal action for each state of nature: action an for state of nature en and action :an for state
of nature :en. The parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the strength of the conict of interests between
principal and agent.8
The principal and agents prior beliefs about the exogenous states are given by a common
probability measure  2 (s) such that the states of nature en; n = 1; :::; N; are i.i.d. and take
place with probability p > 1=2:9







in which A = 1  captures the potential gains due to contracting, F is the set of feasible contracts,
S = f0; 1ge is the set of all possible states and BRg(s) = argmin
b
((s; b)) is the best response of
the agent at state s given contract g:
2.2 Optimal Contract
According to their motivation, BM determine the clauses that the parties should include in the
contract that minimizes writing costs.
Table 1. Candidate Clauses for Task n
Clause Symbology Pay-o¤
Contingent (C) (en  ! an) ^ (:en  ! :an) An   2c
Rigid (R) T  ! an pAn   c
Discretionary (D) T  ! T 0
Table 1 tells us that rigid rules (for all states do an) are preferred to discretionary ones (for any
state do anything) if and only if n > c=pA while contingent rules (for state en do an and for any
8The larger  the stronger the conicts of interest.
9Explain intuition.
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other state dont do an) are preferred to rigid ones if and only if n > c=(1   p)A. That means
that contingent rules (C) are used to describe the most important tasks, rigid rules (R) to describe
tasks of intermediate importance and discretionary rules (D) for the least important ones. Figure
1 shows that decomposition graphically
The intuition is that the higher is the value of a task the more relevant is to assure that the
agent performs the right action. In addition, their model tells us that the more likely is a state (the
higher the value of p) the more intensive becomes the contract in the use of rigid clauses (displacing
discretionary and contingent clauses). The reason is that the more likely is the realization of the
state of nature for which an is the right action the higher is the probability that the contract
generates the maximum surplus A at cost c and not 2c. Finally, the higher are the writing costs
relative to the potential gross surplus (c=A) the more intensive becomes the contract in incomplete
clauses (discretionary and rigid displace contingent). Obviously the reason is that the expected
benets of describing the action that should be executed when a state of nature takes place increases
with the gross surplus but decreases with the writing costs.
2.3 Enforcement Process
The framework of BM assumes that the parties have the same information and all the actions are
observable and veriable. Consequently, at no point there is necessity to call a third party to
control whether the agent fullled the action commanded by the contract. Reality rarely satises
all these assumptions. Instead we should expect that the parties will have di¤erent beliefs of what
is the true state of nature (for example what is the fair value of a corporation) or the level of
complexity of some of the actions will make them non veriable (for example whether a manager
made enough e¤ort to attract all potential buyers of the corporation). Here, we explicitly model the
rst consideration and assume that the parties (agent (A) and principal (P)) have di¤erent beliefs
about the true state of nature. Each of them receive a signal SA(P ) 2 f1; 0g such that if SA(P ) = 1
then A(P ) believes that the true state of nature is en while if SA(P ) = 0 then A(P ) believes that
the true state of nature is :en: The agent observes the true state of nature only with probability
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P (SA = 1 j en) = P (SA = 0 j :en) = 1   "A while the principal does it only with probability
P (SP = 1 j en) = P (SP = 0 j :en) = 1  "P .10
We reinterpret the framework of BM regarding the cost faced by the agent and consider that
once the signal is received she has to decide whether to make a high or low e¤ort. In the rst case
she executes the action demanded by the contract (for example in the case of a contingent clause
b(an) = 1 when s(en) = 1 and b(:an) = 1 when s(:en) = 1) and incurs in a cost11 n while in
the second case she doesnt execute the action demanded by the contract and faces no cost.
By his side, the principal pays the agent the transfer t if and only if he believes the right action
is executed. If he believes the wrong action has been executed it may decide to sue the agent and
demand a legal remedy (later we detail when this takes place.)
In the case of a legal dispute the parties share the litigation expenses  in equal parts and a
court is called to make a decision. The objective of the court is to determine whether the contract
has been fullled by the agent or not.12 In order to do that the court observes the action executed
by the agent and observes its own signal SC 2 f1; 0g which reveals the true state of nature with
probability 1  "C .
Consequent with expectation damages, the damages for the breach of the contract compensate
the promisee (principal) for the injury caused by the non-performing promisor (agent).13 In practical
terms, under a favorable decision (the court believes that the agent executed the right action) the
agent gets t while under a non-favorable decision (the court believes that the agent executed the
wrong action) the agent pays the principal n (compensates him for the utilities he should have
obtained.)
The former description leads to the following timing of actions (which di¤ers from BM)
Timing of actions 1. The principal determines the value of the transfer t 2. The agent receives
her signal and decides what action to execute. 3. The principal receives his signal, observes the
agents action and then decides to pay t or sue the agent for breach of contract. 4. The court
observes its own signal and decides in favor of one of the parties. 5. Payo¤s are realized.
10Clearly the two signals are correlated. For example
P (SA = 1 j SP = 1) = P (SA = 1 j e)P (e j SP = 1) + P (SA = 1 j :e)P (:e j SP = 1)
=
(1  "A)(1  "P )p+ "A"P (1  p)
(1  "P )p+ "P (1  p)
> (1  "A)p+ "A(1  p) = P (SA = 1)
11The expresion increases with the value of the task. That makes the formulation slightly more complicated but
allows us to compare the results with BM.
12Unlike in Bustos [2005] in which the court enforces the rule that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the
economic agents, here the court enforces the rule that the parties wanted before they wrote the contract.
13Under expectation damages the victim is indi¤erent between performance and breach (for a detailed explanation
see Cooter and Ulen (2003)).
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3 Optimal Clauses in the Presence of Enforcement Costs
In this section we determine the optimal combination of contingent, rigid and discretionary clauses
when the parties not only face writing costs but also enforcement costs (litigation) and then compare
it with the optimal combination of clauses when the parties only face writing costs. We show
that still is true that the most important tasks are described with contingent clauses. However,
contingent clauses are used less frequently. The reason is that, unlike discretionary and rigid clauses,
they can generate (costly) litigation. Under a contingent clause the principal never claims that the
agent has intentionally executed the wrong action because he knows that she always make high
e¤ort but he may claim that the agent executed the wrong action due to an erroneous belief about
the state of nature.
A central result of this Section is that the probability that the principal sues the agent increases
with the value of the task that is described by the clause. The reason is that, the higher is this
value the smaller is the threshold in the intensity of the conict of beliefs between the parties that
will trigger a trial.
3.1 Assumptions
First we introduce two restrictions in the parameters that allow us to simplify the mathematical
analysis. Said that, we believe that the results apply to more general conditions.
Assumption 1 (Misperceptions are small): "A; "B ; "C < 1=2:
Assumption 2 (Existence of pure strategies equilibrium):
  (1  "A)"A(1  2"C)(2p  1)((1  "P )
2 + ("P )
2)
[(1  "A)p+ "A(1  p)] [p("P   "A)  "P "A +max("P ; "A)]
min
max
3.2 Strategies of the Players
We use backward induction to characterize the game played by the agent, the principal and the
court before the payo¤s are realized. Although there is a mixed and a pure strategies equilibrium
we only characterize the last one because we get a clearer intuition of the results.
Court assigns responsibilities
For each type of clause the court decides in favor of the agent when
Contingent Clauses: the agent executed an and SC = 1 or executed :an and SC = 0:
Rigid Clauses: the agent executed an regardless SC = 1 or SC = 0:
Discretionary Clauses: the agent executed an or :an regardless SC = 1 or SC = 0
9
If we denote by (
) the a-priori probability that the court decides in favor of the agent, where

 is the available information of the player who is making the estimation then: under a contingent
clause this probability is (1   "C)P (en j 
) + "CP (:en j 
) when the agent executes an (court
observes that state of nature is en) and "CP (en j 
)+ (1  "C)P (:en j 
) when the agent executes
:an (court observes that state of nature is :en): Under a rigid clause this probability is 1 if the
agent executes an and 0 if the agent executes :an. Under a discretionary clause this probability is
1 as the court always decide in favor of the agent.
Principal decides to pay t or sue
We analyze the decision of the principal for each of the clauses.
1. Under a contingent clause, the principal sues the agent if and only if
(
P )(p(
P )n   t)| {z }
Decision favors agent
+ (1  (
P )) (n + p(
P )n)| {z }





P )n| {z }
Agent executes right action
  (
P )t| {z }




P ) is the probability that the agent made the decision demanded by the contract (before
the principal decided to sue) and (
P ) is the probability that the court decides in favor of the
agent in both cases, given the information owned by the principal 
P :
The principal sues the agent only if the expected benets of letting the court decide whether
the agent performed the action demanded by the contract are higher than the expected benets
generated by the action of the agent p(
P )n minus the compensation that the principal is willing
to pay (
P )t. This last expression requires more explanation.
The principal would prefer not to pay the transfer t to the agent at all, nevertheless, if he does
that and it is true that (
A)t =2 > 0 the agent will sue the principal for breach of contract. By
its side the principal doesnt want this trial as that would cost him (
P )t+=2 and would generate
no benets. Instead the principal is willing to o¤er a maximum of (
P )t to the agent to settle the
dispute. In order to keep the analysis simple, we assume that the agent has all the bargaining power
when both players observe the same signal ((
A)t < (
P )t) because in this case the evidence
favors her but the principal has all the bargaining power when both players observe di¤erent signals
((
A)t > (
P )t) because in this case the evidence is divided. Consequently as the agent always
extract (
P )t in the eventuality of a bargaining process the principal freely o¤ers that amount
when he decides not to sue.
The principal initiates legal actions if and only if the value of the task is bigger than the litigation






At this point we notice that due to the revelation principle the principal o¤ers the agent the
transfer that induces her to make high e¤ort with certainty. In that case the action of the agent
truthfully reveals her signal. Given that, we identify four possible values of (
P ) and n which
are summarized in the following table
Table 2. Court Decisions (




P ) pT (
P )




1 if n  11
0 if n < 11




1 if n  10
0 if n < 10




1 if n  01
0 if n < 01




1 if n  00
0 if n < 00
A central result of the paper is that the probability that the principal sues the agent increases
with the value of the task n: The reason is that the benet of a trial relative to the benet
of not having trial is the value of the task times the probability that the court decides in favor
of the principal which is a constant: Alternativelly the set of combinations of signals observed by
the players that generate a trial increases with the value of n. Even more, it is easy to show14
that 11 > 00 > 10 > 01 (the rst superindex refers to the signal observed by the agent and
teh second superindex to the signal observed by the principal) which means that trials take place
more frequently when the principal and the agent receive di¤erent signals as the conict of beliefs
is stronger than in the case in which they receive the same signals.15 We summarize the former
considerations in the following lemma
Lemma 1 Under contingent clauses the frequency of trials increases with n




0 if n < 01












1 if n > 11
14Here we use assumption 1.
15 In addition trials take place more frequently when the principal observes that the true state of nature is :e
because this state of nature, unconditionally, takes place less frequently than e (recall that p > 1=2).
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which establishes the result
The lemma tells us what is the e¤ect of the ability of each player ("A; "P and "C) over the
decision of the court. The less able is the agent, the more frequently the court decides in favor
of the principal ((
P ) decreases with "A). The less able is the principal the more frequently the
court decides in favor of the agent when the signals are di¤erent but the less frequently when the
signals are the same. The reason is that in the rst case the court becomes less certain that the
agent observed the right signal while in the second one it becomes more certain. Finally, we cannot
conclude whether an increment in the ability of the court increases or decreases the probability of
a decision in favor of the agent because the mistakes of the court can go in both directions. The
aggregate e¤ect will depend on the relative capacities of the parties in dispute. Lemma A.1 of the
appendix formally proves these results.
You may notice that we have not mentioned whether the agent (who doesnt perform the right
action and is sued) prefers to litigate, pay the damages or settle the dispute. As we show in the
appendix, thanks to assumption 2 which says that  is not very big and the fact that we have
ruled out renegotiation, she always prefer litigation. The reason depends on whether the parties
observe the same or di¤erent signals. In the rst case the value in dispute n + t is big enough to
make litigation preferable. In the second case the di¤erences in beliefs about the state of nature
are strong enough to make litigation preferable.
2. Under a rigid clause the principal never sues because the court always decide in favor of the
agent. As the agent always execute an (regardless of what signal did she observe) there is no space
for mistakes. Then, it is never protable for the principal to sue.
3. Under a discretionary clause the principal never sues for obvious reasons.
Agent decides e¤ort














































is the information set in which the agent observes signal SA = 1 and executes :an: The relation tells
us that the agent makes high e¤ort only when the expected savings for facing trials less frequently
are bigger than the cost of making a higher e¤ort. Analogously, when the agent observes SA = 0
12













































A refer to the cases in which the agent observes
SA = 0:
Principal determines the value of the transfer
Due to the revelation principle the principal always prefer the agent to make high e¤ort. The
principal imposes the minimum transfer that achieves that result. In the appendix we show that















reason is that the probability that the agent makes high e¤ort is minimal when trials never take
place (pT (
1A) = pT (

1
A) = 0): In that case it may seem that the agent would always want to make
low e¤ort. Nevertheless the fact that the principal would pay her no transfer convinces her to make

















assures that the agent always make high e¤ort. Notice that assumption 2 tells us that n   t > 0
for all n 2 [min; max] :
3.3 Optimal Contract (without vague clauses)
As in BM, we are interested in nding the combination of clauses that maximizes the aggregate








(1  "P )j ("P )(1 j)
h
pT (
P ) eEijS + (1  pT (
P ))EijS i
+(1  p)(1  "A)i ("A)(1 i) (1  "P )j ("P )(1 j)
h
pT (




where eEijS is the aggregate utility when the agent observes signal i, the principal observes signal
j and there is litigation and E
ij
S is the same aggregate utility but this time when there is no
litigation. Expression (5) takes into account all the possible combinations of states of nature and
signals observed by the players. Notice that the probability of a trial is the one with which the
principal sues the agent. The next table summarizes the payo¤s for the di¤erent clauses as a
function of the value of the task that is described in the contract (in the appendix we provide a
detailed calculation of these values).
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Table 3. Candidate Clauses for Task n (with enforcement costs)
Clause Symbology Pay-o¤
Contingent (C) (en  ! an) ^ (:en  ! :an) (1  "A)An   2c 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 if n > 11












0 if n < 01
Rigid (R) T  ! an pAn   c
Discretionary (D) T  ! T 0
where 1 = [p ((1  "A)"P + "A) + (1  p)(1  "A"P )] ; 2 = [(1  "A)"P + (1  "P )"A]
and 3 = [(1  p)(1  "A)"P + p(1  "P )"A] with 1 > 2 > 3
The benet of a contingent clause (1   "A)An only depends on the ability of the agent to
observe the correct state of nature. The abilities of the principal ("P ) and the court ("C) are not
relevant from a social point of view because they dont a¤ect the frequency with which the agent
executes the right action (recall that the agent always make high e¤ort).
The cost of a contingent clause is of the form 2c+: The rst part refers to the writing process
while the second one to the enforcement process. More specically, the parameter  captures the
frequency with which the principal sues the agent due to a supposed breach of the contract. This
frequency increases with the incapacity of the agent to observe the true state of nature as well
as with the incapacity of the same principal to observe the true state. Unlike the rst point the
second one is not obvious because the principal knows that the court may decide less frequently
in his favor when he is less reliable however the fact that he thinks that the agent is more often
mistaken dominates his nal decision. Once again the ability of the court is irrelevant from the
social point of view because its judicial decision imposes only a transfer of value between the agent
and the principal. However the ability of the court, as well as the ability of the parties, do a¤ect
the incentives faced by the principal to initiate a trial and that is captured by the dependence of
the limits n with respect to "C .16
On a di¤erent side, notice that although the marginal benet of a contingent clause doesnt
change, the marginal cost of litigation increases (at intervals) with the value of the task. The
reason is that the principal has higher incentives to be sure that the agent will execute the right
action.
A direct implication of comparing tables 1 and 3 is that the pay-o¤ of contingent clauses when
the parties face enforcement costs is smaller than the pay-o¤ of the same clauses when they dont
16From a social point of view, more litigation is not desirable because it only constitutes a transfer between the
players but from the point of view of the principal it is a way to extract a higher portion of the incremental benets
associated to task n.
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face these costs. There are two reasons for that. First, the agent executes the wrong action when
she observes the wrong state of nature and second, litigation is costly.17 The pay-o¤ of a rigid or
discretionary clause does not change because neither of them induces the principal to sue the agent.
As a result, from a social point of view, contracts should be less intensive in contingent clauses than
what the analysis of BM suggests.
However it is still true that the most important tasks are described with contingent clauses
because it is still true that they achieve a higher marginal benet than the incompleteclauses.18
The next proposition summarizes the former considerations.
Proposition 2 Contracts in which the parties face writing and enforcement costs use contingent
clauses less frequently than contracts in which the parties dont face enforcement costs. However
unless the agent often misinterprets the true state of nature ("A < 1 p) it is still true that contingent
clauses are used to describe the most important tasks of the contract.
Proof. The pay-o¤ of a contingent clause when there are no enforcement costs is An   2c (table
1). The pay-o¤ of a contingent clause when there are enforcement costs is of the general form
(1   "A)An   2c    (table 3). Hence, there are values of n for which contingent clauses are
preferred to rigid ones when there are enforcement costs but are not preferred when there are only
writing costs. In addition, for all values of n for which contingent clauses are preferred to rigid
ones when there are enforcement costs it is true that contingent clauses are preferred to rigid ones
when there are not enforcement costs. Consequently, the set of tasks described with contingent
clauses is smaller when there are enforcement costs than when there are only writing costs.
In order to see that contingent clauses are used to describe the most important tasks we notice
the following. The highest and the lowest payo¤s of a contingent clause are (1  "A)An   2c and
(1  "A)An   2c   respectively. The pay-o¤ of a rigid clause is pAn   c. Then conditional on
"A < 1  p we identify two cases of optimal combination of clauses in contracts.







such that all tasks with value n 2
[; c=pA] are described with rigid clauses and all tasks with value n   are described with
17 It is direct to notice that the pay-o¤ of a contingent clause is the same in tables 1 and 3 when "A =  = 0:
18To see that point it is enough to make n big enough to compensate for the additional costs of facing an
enforcement process.
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contingent clauses as it is shown in gure 2.
The pay-o¤ of a contingent clause is higher than the pay-o¤ of a rigid clause when n >
c+
(1 p "A)A but the pay-o¤ of a rigid clause is higher than the pay-o¤ of a contingent clause when
n <
c





























: The reason is that in








in which tasks are alternately described with rigid and contingent clauses. That exactly is case 2.












such that all tasks with value n 2

minfig; c=pA are described with rigid clauses, all tasks
with value n  maxfig are described with contingent clauses and all tasks with value n 2
minfig;maxfig are alternatively described with rigid and contingent clauses as it is shown in
gure 3
The proof ends by noticing that in both cases, the most important tasks are described with
contingent clauses
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4 Vague Clauses and Optimal Contracts
One of the most serious omissions in the framework of BM is that it does not allow the parties
to include vague clauses in the contract. Vague clauses are terms which dont explicitly specify
the action that the agent has to execute but instead only demand the best e¤ort in the performed
action. Examples of vague terms are: make a decision in the best interest of the principal, act
in good faithor make a reasonable decision. These clauses are not only commonplace in private
contracts but also in the law. An illustration is § 271 of the Delawares Corporate Law referring to
the sale, lease or exchange of assets (italics are ours)
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or governing body sell, lease or
exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets, including its goodwill and its corporate
franchises, upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which may consist in whole
or in part of money or other property, including shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any
other corporation or corporations, as its board of directors or governing body deems expedient and
for the best interests of the corporation
The parties are interested in including these clauses in their contracts because, comparatively
to contingent clauses, are cheaper to write. The literature argues that their main disadvantage is
that they increase the enforcement costs because they generate disputes of interpretation (what the
agent was supposed to execute according to the contract) more frequently. Here we show that it is
not necessarily the case that vague clauses generate more trials than precise clauses. Indeed vague
clauses always generate less legal disputes than contingent clauses when they are used to describe
the most important tasks of the contract.
In order to understand why is that the case we have to notice that while a contingent clause
demands that the agent has to perform the optimal action for the true state of nature a vague clause
demands that the agent has to perform the optimal action for her believed state of nature. A direct
consequence is that the probability that a precise clause generates a trial depends on the di¤erence
of beliefs between the parties about the true state of nature but the probability that a vague
clause generates a trial depends on the principals belief that the agent didnt perform the optimal
action (or didnt make enough e¤ort) for her belief about nature. A direct consequence is that
the probability of a trial increases with the value of a task when the clause is contingent because
a smaller conict of beliefs between the parties is enough to trigger a trial but this probability
decreases when the clause is vague because the agent performs the optimal action more frequently
in order to avoid a trial in which she could be forced to pay too high expectation damages.
We model the behavior of the court assuming that it observes the signal of the agent (and not the
true state of nature) and its ability is limited (not always observe correctly.) Interestingly, neither
the ability of the court nor the one of the contracting parties determine whether the contract should
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be more intensive in vague or contingent clauses.
4.1 Adding Vague Clauses
In order to model vague clauses we introduce a new type of action that we call rst best and denote
a. Then a vague clause is of the type T ! a and reads: for any state of nature do the best
action. In extensive terms T ! a is equivalent to (en  ! an) ^ (:en  ! :an) nevertheless its
writing cost is only c. Why is not obvious from there that vague clauses always dominate contingent
ones? The answer is that these clauses generate di¤erent probabilities that the court decides in
favor of the principal in the case of a dispute.
As already mentioned, the objective of a court that has to enforce a vague clause is to assure that
the agent has performed the right action for her belief about the true state of nature. Accordingly,
we assume that the court receives a signal SC 2 f1; 0g of the signal observed by the agent such
that if SC = 1 the court believes that the agent observed SA = 1 and if SC = 0 the court believes
that the agent observed SA = 0. In order to keep the results comparable, we assume that the court
observes the true signal with the same probability that it observes the true state 1  "C .
The remedy system and the timing of actions are as before.
4.2 Strategies of the Players
Before calculating the strategies of the players when they face vague clauses we have to notice that
there is only a mixed strategies equilibrium. There is no pure strategies equilibrium because if the
agent always make high e¤ort the court always decide in favor of the agent and then trials never
take place. But if trials dont take place the agent always make low e¤ort and then we dont have
an equilibrium (notice that the same logic doesnt work in the case of contingent clauses because
even when there are tasks that never generate a trial the strategy of the court is not to decide in
favor of the agent with certainty. The last point generates a di¤erence in the transfer obtained by
the agent when she makes high instead of low e¤ort. That di¤erence convinces her to make the
extra e¤ort).
Court assigns responsibilities
The court decides in favor of the agent when
Vague Clauses: the agent executed an and SC = 1 or the agent executed :an and SC = 0:
This time the a-priori probability that the court decides in favor of the agent when the clause
is vague is P (SA = 1 j 
)(1  "C) + P (SA = 0 j 
)"C when the agent executes an and P (SA = 1 j

)"C + P (SA = 0 j 
)(1  "C) when the agent executes :an:
Principal decides to pay t or sue
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In the case of vague clauses, the principal must be indi¤erent between suing and not suing
(
P )(p(
P )n   t) + (1  (




P )n   (
P )t
Then, independent whether the agent executed an or :an or the principal observed en or :en
the court decides in favor of the agent with probability
(
P ) = 1  =2
n
(6)
The probability that the court decides in favor of the agent increases with n otherwise the
principal would always prefer to sue as it becomes a dominant strategy. For the same reason the
probability that the court decides in favor of the agent decreases with .
But the court decides in favor of the principal only when it believes that the agent performed
the wrong action for her perceived signal. That is (
P ) is a function of the signal of the court and
the equilibrium strategy of the agent. Then, expression (6) allows us to determine the probabilities
that the agent makes high e¤ort when she receives signal SA = 1 which we denote  and when she
receives signal SA = 0 which we denote . The next lemma, which we prove in the appendix, states
the important result that these two expressions are increasing functions in n
Lemma 3 When the agent receives signal SA = 1 she makes high e¤ort with probability
 =
B2  AB
B2   1 (7)
when the agent receives signal SA = 1 she makes high e¤ort with probability
 =
B2  B=A





 "C and A =
[p(1 "A)+(1 p)"A]
[p"A+(1 p)(1 "A)] . In addition  and  are increasing in n:
The e¤ort made by the agent increases with the value of the task because the agent is interested
in avoiding a trial in which she would have to pay expectation damages are too high. In the same
token, the e¤ort made by the agent decreases with the cost of litigation because the probability
that the principal sues decreases.
Agent decides e¤ort
In a mixed strategies equilibrium the agent is indi¤erent between high and low e¤ort. When
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she observes SA = 1 that is equivalent to
pT
h
(1  "C)t   "Cn   
2
i




   (1  "C)n   
2
i
  (1  pT ) ["Ct]
where pT is the probability that the principal sues when he observes action an and pT the probability
when he observes action :an. When she observes SA = 0 that is equivalent to
pT
h
(1  "C)t   "Cn   
2
i




   (1  "C)n   
2
i
  (1  pT ) ["Ct]
From where we have that
pT = pT =
n + t
(1  2"C)
(n + 2t) (1  2"C) (11)
It is direct to see that the probability that the principal initiates a trial does not depend on its own
signal because that probability does not depend on the signal of the agent either (it only depends
on the action).19 Does this probability increase with the value of the task? The following lemma
provides us the answer
Lemma 4 Under vague clauses the frequency of trials decreases with n












19 It is true that
pT = pT ( j an; Sp = 1)P (Sp = 1 j SA = 1) + pT ( j an; Sp = 0)P (Sp = 0 j SA = 1)
pT = pT ( j an; Sp = 1)P (Sp = 1 j SA = 0) + pT ( j an; Sp = 0)P (Sp = 0 j SA = 0)
and that
[P (Sp = 1 j SA = 1)  P (Sp = 1 j SA = 0)] = [P (Sp = 0 j SA = 0)  P (Sp = 0 j SA = 1)]
which implies that
pT = pT ( j an; Sp = 1) = pT ( j an; Sp = 0)
Analogously we can show that
pT = pT ( j an; Sp = 1) = pT ( j an; Sp = 0)
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where  < (1 2"C)2 follows from assumptions 1 and 2 ( and "C are small enough)
The result is the opposite of lemma 1. The higher the value of the task that is described by the
contract the smaller is the probability that the principal sues the agent. As explained before the
higher is n the more likely is that the agent will make high e¤ort (as expectation damages of n
dominate the e¤ort cost of n) and with that lower the probability that the court decides in favor
of the principal in the case of a legal dispute.
4.3 Optimal Contract (with vague clauses)
At this point we are almost ready to characterize the optimal contract when the parties have the
option to write vague clauses and then compare it with the contract in which they dont have
this option (the one that we characterized in Section 2.4). We just need to calculate the pay-o¤
associated to vague clauses.
Pay-o¤ of Vague Clauses
As in the case of contingent clauses we evaluate (5). The result, which is presented in table 4
and formally derived in the appendix tells us that the marginal benet of the clause is equal to the
probability that the agent performs the right action for a given state of nature. And that is the
addition of the probability that the agent observes the true state and makes high e¤ort (probability
(1  "A)) with the probability that she observes the wrong state and makes low e¤ort (probability
"A(1  )).
On the side of the costs, the clause involves writing costs c (only uses a primitive sentence) and
enforcement costs pT (trials take place with probability pT )
Table 4. Pay-o¤ of Vague Clauses for Task n
Clause Symbology Pay-o¤
Vague (C) T  ! a [(1  "A)+ "A(1  )]An   c  pT
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that the pay-o¤ of a vague clause increases with n and converges to
(1  "A)An  c  1 2"C  form where it is direct that there exists a certain threshold for the value
of the task such that all tasks which value is higher than this threshold will be described with
vague and not contingent clauses. In other words, the most important tasks of the contract will be
described with vague terms. That result is formally stated in the following proposition
Proposition 5 Contracts in which the parties have the option to write vague clauses are less
intensive in the use of contingent clauses than contracts in which the parties dont have the option
to write vague clauses. In addition, vague clauses are used to describe the most important tasks.
Proof. First we identify the values of a task that make the parties indi¤erent between the clauses
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that they include in their contract
[(1  "A)(bR) + "A(1  (bR))  p]AbR = pT (bR)
and
[(1  "A)((bi)  1) + "A(1  (bi))]Abi = (pT (bi)  i)  c;8i 2 f1; 1; 2; 3; 0g
where bR establishes indi¤erence between rigid and vague and not contingent clauses. In other
words, the most important tasks of the contract should be described with vague terms. That result
is formally stated in the following proposition
Proposition 6 Contracts in which the parties have the option to write vague clauses are less
intensive in the use of contingent clauses than contracts in which the parties dont have the option
to write vague clauses. In addition, vague clauses are used to describe the most important tasks.
Proof. First we identify the values of a task that make the parties indi¤erent between the clauses
that they include in their contract
[(1  "A)(bR) + "A(1  (bR))  p]AbR = pT (bR)
and
[(1  "A)((bi)  1) + "A(1  (bi))]Abi = (pT (bi)  i)  c;8i 2 f1; 1; 2; 3; 0g
where bR establishes indi¤erence between rigid and vague while bi establish indi¤erence between
contingent and vague. Depending on the order relation of theses parameters we identify three cases
of optimal combination of clauses
Case 1: When b = min fbR; fbigig = bR then the optimal distribution of clauses is given by
22
Case 2: When b = min fbR; fbigig 6= bR and we are in case 1 of proposition 2 then the optimal
distribution of clauses is given by
Case 3: When b = min fbR; fbigig 6= bR and we are in case 2 of proposition 2 then the optimal
distribution of clauses is given by
In all of the cases, contingent clauses are used less than in contracts in which vague clauses are
not an option and vague clauses are used to describe the most important tasks
Interestingly the result stated in proposition 5 doesnt depend on the relative abilities of the
players,20 which will be a prediction of Scott and Triantis. The superiority of vague clauses over
contingent clauses derives from the fact that the principal sues the agent less frequently and that
does not happens because the agent or the court are more or less reliable but because vague clauses
20 In order to see that point more clearly we can write down the pay-o¤ of the clauses when the solution is symmetric





and the probability of a
trial is 
1 2"C . Then the pay-o¤ of a vague clause becomes
[(1  "A)+ "A(1  )]An   c  
1  2"C

which can be rewriten as 












and that expression is bigger than (1  "A)n   c   for all values of "C and "A:
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reduce the source of conicts between the parties.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied how litigation a¤ects the optimal combination of precise and vague clauses
written in contracts. We showed that an analysis based in the trade-o¤ of writing and enforcement
costs is likely to lead to a suboptimal combination of clauses.
We showed that vague clauses are not only cheaper to write but they may also be cheaper to
enforce. The reason is that vague clauses tend to generate less litigation than contingent clauses.
Vague clauses generate litigation less frequently because their source of conict tends to disap-
pear when the value of the task that is being described increases. The reason is that the agent
tends to increase her e¤ort to perform the right action in order to reduce the possibility of a lawsuit
that would oblige her to pay bigger compensatory damages. Unlike that, the source of conict in
precise clauses tend to increase with the value of the task that is being described. The reason is
that a smaller discrepancy between the principal and the agent about the true state of nature will
be enough to trigger a trial as the value in dispute is higher. Direct implications are that contracts
should be less intensive in contingent clauses than what the study of BM has suggested and vague
clauses should be used to describe the most important tasks of the contract.
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A Appendix
Lemma A.1 The probability that the court decides in favor of the agent
(i) always decrease with "A
(ii) increases with "P if and only if SA = SP
(iii.1) decreases with "C if SA = SP = 1
(iii.2) decreases with "C if SA = SP = 0 and p < (1  "A)(1  "P )=((1  "A)(1  "P ) + "A"P )
(iii.3) decreases with "C if SA = 0; SP = 1 and p < (1  "A)"P =((1  "A)"P + "A(1  "P ))
(iii.4) decreases with "C if SA = 1; SP = 0 and p > (1  "P )"A=((1  "A)"P + "A(1  "P ))
Proof. We derive the expressions that determine the sign of the derivative of (
P ) with respect to "
















) < 0() p < (1  "A)"P












) < 0() p > (1  "P )"A











) < 0() p < (1  "P )(1  "A)
(1  "A)(1  "P ) + "A"P




















) = sgn((1  "P )"P (1  p)p(2"C   1)(1  2"A)) < 0




















) = sgn((1  "A)p(1  p)"A(1  2"C)) > 0
which ends the proof
The Agent always prefer to litigate
The agent who doesnt perform the right action and is sued wants to litigate only when
 (1  (
A))n + (
A)t  =2 >  n












and the parties prefer litigation to settlement when
 (1  (
A))n + (
A)t > (1  (
P ))n   (
P )t
As the last relation is always true (n + t > 0) we only have to analyze for each combination of signals whether
(A1) implies (A0). We analyze separately the cases in which the principal and the agent observe a di¤erent signal
from the cases in which they observe the same signal.
When SA 6= SP we have that 1  (
P ) < (
A) because the agent believes that the court decides in his favor
with probability P (SA 6= SP j SA)(
SA 6=SPP ) + P (SA = SP j SA)(
SA=SPP ) while the principal believes that the
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court decides in favor of the agent with probability (
SA 6=SPP ) which is smaller.
When SA = SP we have that 1  (
P ) < (
A) because of assumption 2 ( is small). For (A1) to imply (A0)








And if we replace t for t the expression becomes
=2
(1  (

















and that is true because of assumption 2.
Value of the Transfer
























































Notice that pT (

1
A) > pT (

1
A) because it is more likely that the principal sues the agent when he observes :an




A) because the court is more likely to decide for the agent when she executes an
than when she executes :an: In the same way pT (









A): Then it is direct that the
right hand side of (A2) is maximum when pT (
1A) = pT (

1




A) = pT (

0
A) = 0: Then, if we impose that the transfer is t
 we have that (A2) and (A3) are always satised.
Coe¢ cients in Table 3
As neither rigid nor discretionary clauses generate trials, they have no enforcement costs associated. In the case
of contingent clauses we identify the values of eEijS and EijS as follows
Values of eEijS (there is litigation)
Principal Agent AggregateeE11S = eE10S n   (1  "C)t + "Cn   =2 (1  "C)t   "Cn   =2  n An   eE01S = eE00S  (1  "C)t + "Cn   =2 (1  "C)t   "Cn   =2  n  
Values of E
ij











S  t t 0
Then we calculate the pay-o¤ (PO) of the contingent clause for all values of n
1. For n > 11 there is always litigation
PO = pf(1  "A) eE11S + "A eE01S g+ (1  p)f(1  "A) eE10S + "A eE00S g   2c
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PO = (1  "A)An     2c




there is always litigation unless SA = SP = 1
PO = pf(1  "A)
h
(1  "P )E11S + "P eE10S i+ "A eE01S g+ (1  p)f(1  "A) eE00S + "A h(1  "P ) eE10S + "PE11S ig   2c
PO = pf(1  "A) [(1  "P )An + "P (An   )] + "A( )g+
(1  p)f(1  "A)( ) + "A [(1  "P )(An   ) + "PAn]g   2c
PO = (1  "A)An   [p ((1  "A)"P + "A) + (1  p)(1  "A"P )]  2c




there is always litigation unless SA = SP = 1 and SA = SP = 0
PO = pf(1  "A)
h
(1  "P )E11S + "P eE10S i+ "A h(1  "P ) eE01S + "PE00S ig+
(1  p)f(1  "A)
h
(1  "P )E00S + "P eE01S i+ "A h(1  "P ) eE10S + "PE11S ig   2c
PO = pf(1  "A) [(1  "P )An + "P (An   )] + "A [(1  "P )( ) + "P 0]g+
(1  p)f(1  "A) [(1  "P )0 + "P ( )] + "A [(1  "P )(An   ) + "PAn]g   2c
PO = (1  "A)An   [(1  "A)"P + (1  "P )"A]  2c




there is only litigation when SA = 0 and SP = 1
PO = pf(1  "A)E11S + "A
h
(1  "P ) eE01S + "PE00S ig+ (1  p)f(1  "A) h(1  "P )E00S + "P eE01S i+ "AE11S g   2c
PO = pf(1  "A)An + "A [(1  "P )( ) + "P 0]g+ (1  p)f(1  "A) [(1  "P )0 + "P ( )] + "AAng   2c
PO = (1  "A)An   [(1  p)(1  "A)"P + p(1  "P )"A]  2c
5. For n < 01 there is never litigation
PO = pf(1  "A)E11S + "AE01S g+ (1  p)f(1  "A)E10S + "AE00S g   2c
PO = (1  "A)An   2c
Proof of Lemma 3
We know that in the case that the agent executes action an the court decides in her favor only when it observes
SC = 1 which is equal to
P (SC = 1 j SA = 1)P (SA = 1 j an) + P (SC = 1 j SA = 0)P (SA = 0 j an) = 1  =2
n
analogously, in the case in which the agent executes action :an the court decides in her favor only when it observes
SC = 0 which is equal to
P (SC = 0 j SA = 1)P (SA = 1 j :an) + P (SC = 0 j SA = 0)P (SA = 0 j :an) = 1  =2
n
We can rewrite these identities as
(1  "C) [p(1  "A) + (1  p)"A] + "C(1  ) [p"A + (1  p)(1  "A)]




"C(1  ) [p(1  "A) + (1  p)"A] + (1  "C) [p"A + (1  p)(1  "A)]




















B2 + 1  2BA




which ends the proof 
Coe¢ cients in Table 4
In the case of vague clauses we identify the values of eEijS and EijS as follows
Values of eEijS (there is litigation)
Principal Agent AggregateeE11S = eE10S 2n   t   =2 t   n(1 + )  =2 An   eE01S = eE00S 2(1  e)n   (1  e)t   =2 (1  e)t   (1  e)(1 + )n   =2 (1  e)An   
Values of E
ij











S (1  e)n   t  (1  e)n + t (1  e)An
from where we retrieve the payo¤s in table 4.
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